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Abstract
Weconsideraneconomywhereindividualsprivatelychooseeffortandtradecompetitively
priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance
against a negative shock is sufﬁciently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions
ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance combi-
nation that is unique and satisﬁes ﬁrst- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance
incompleteness in terms of costly production of private insurance services, we characterize
the constrained inefﬁciency arising in general equilibrium from competitive pricing of non-
exclusive ﬁnancial contracts.
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11 Introduction
A recent literature has studied the implications of hidden savings for constrained-efﬁcient con-
sumptionproﬁleswhentheprobabilitydistributionofincomerealizationsdependsonprivately
chosen effort (see Ábrahám, Koehne and Pavoni, 2011, and their references). Not only non-
contingent savings, but also insurance is at least partly excluded from the public information
set in reality, and a less recent and very inﬂuential literature established that a competitive in-
surance equilibrium is inefﬁcient and may fail to exist in the presence of moral hazard. Inefﬁ-
ciency arises from the fact that the premium charged by competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries,
rather than by a single “exclusive” insurer covering each individual’s risks, neglects the effect of
insurance on effort unless the full extent of coverage is publicly observed (Pauly, 1974). Insur-
ance against speciﬁc accident or health events, like consumer credit (Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992)
and other contracts where default is possible, tries to address this problem with provisions that
prevent multiple coverage of speciﬁc risks and market-level information pooling arrangements.
Moral hazard inefﬁciencies cannot be eliminated completely, however, if portfolios of competi-
tively traded contracts are only partially observable.
When competitively priced contingent securities pay off with a probability that depends on
hiddenactions,theequilibriummayfailtoexistbecausestandardfunctionalformassumptions
donotsufﬁcetoensurethatexpectedutilityisaconcavefunctionofindividualchoicesandthat
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions are sufﬁcient for optimality (Helpman and Laffont, 1975). As it
may be optimal for price-taking individuals to jointly change insurance and effort choices, it is
then not possible to ensure that insurance be priced consistently with effort-determined payoff
probabilities.
In this paper, we analyze constrained efﬁciency and equilibrium existence in an economy
where a continuous unobservable effort choice inﬂuences the probability of two possible in-
come realizations and non-exclusive unit insurance contracts are competitively traded. We es-
tablish that if insurance is actuarially unfair enough then an equilibrium with positive effort
can exist and be characterized by ﬁrst-order conditions. Under plausible functional form re-
strictions, local concavity can be guaranteed by unfair insurance at all allocations where the
ﬁrst-order conditions hold. Standard continuity and differentiability properties of the model’s
primitive functions ensure that only one such allocation may exist and that, even though the
objective function may be non-concave at allocations for which the ﬁrst-order conditions are
2not satisﬁed, joint deviations in effort and insurance cannot be individually optimal.
This novel formal result illustrates more general insights, and is related to previous contri-
butions. Moral hazard is one of the forms of asymmetric-information-based discretion on con-
tractual deliveries for which Bisin et al. (2011) provide formal restrictions that ensure existence
of equilibria, which are generically constrained inefﬁcient in the presence of adverse selection.
Mirrlees (1971), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), and others let observable outcomes be a deter-
ministic function of effort choices based on privately observed ability realizations, a source of
adverse-selection problems. In that setting, as shown by Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007, appen-
dix A), there can be no trade in non-exclusive contingent securities. In our model, as in Pauly
(1974), Ábrahám and Pavoni (2005), and other moral-hazard settings, privately chosen actions
determine a non-degenerate probability distribution for outcomes. Then, a non-exclusive mar-
ket for trade in securities contingent on idiosyncratic realizations is active unless it is ruled out
by assuming exclusive insurance.
We establish our result, in a single-period economy, by a technique similar to that applied
by Ábrahám, Koehne and Pavoni (2011) to a two-period moral-hazard economy where non-
contingent savings are hidden, but insurance is assumed to be exclusive. The resulting insights
arerelatedtothoseobtainedbyHelpmanandLaffont(1975), GreenwaldandStiglitz(1986), and
others in models where insurance is actuarially fair. However, we offer a novel perspective on
the source and implications of the insurance incompleteness which, in previous work, plays a
role in ensuring equilibrium existence for competitive non-exclusive asset trade under asym-
metric information. Asset position limits or bid-ask spreads prevent deviations in Bisin and
Gottardi (1999), and latent contracts support a competitive high-effort equilibrium in Bisin and
Guaitoli’s (2004) model with two effort levels (see also Hellwig 1983a,b). Loss and Piaser (2013)
extend this analysis allowing for continuous effort, and show that non-concavity of the objec-
tive function may let individuals be indifferent between exerting an interior amount of effort
(and insuring the loss partially) and setting the effort at the lowest possible level (and overin-
suring). In equilibrium, the insurance price is fair for the probabilities implied by the low effort
choice,butunfairfortheprobabilitiesimpliedbythehighereffortchoice. Thismakesitoptimal
to insure only partially if high effort is chosen. Partial insurance equilibria with positive proﬁts
are theoretically possible in such settings, because if any insurer deviated to offer a lower price,
then individuals would discontinuously shift to low effort and overinsurance. Unproﬁtability of
3such deviations can sustain an equilibrium with positive proﬁts, but may appear not particu-
larly plausible (Hellwig, 1983b, p.4).
We argue that costs for insurance production are a more plausible source of incomplete in-
surance,andweshowthatastandardrepresentationoftheﬁxedandvariablecostsofinsurance
production can support a unique competitive free-entry equilibrium with partial insurance.
Our technical result makes it possible to use the ﬁrst-order conditions to characterize the na-
ture of the equilibrium inefﬁciency implied by non-exclusive trade of unit insurance contracts
in the presence of moral hazard. Extending the pure-exchange structure of the economies stud-
ied by earlier contributions, we explicitly model insurance production costs.1 A non-exclusive
competitive equilibrium where contingent securities are traded at actuarially unfair prices can
exist, and is characterized by ﬁrst-order conditions, when processing unit insurance contracts
is costly. Transaction costs do not by themselves imply inefﬁciency, and the inefﬁciency arising
from moral hazard can be addressed by linear taxation of anonymous insurance transactions
or by public transfer schemes that use a transaction technology different from the one that
produces private insurance contracts. On such issues, our contribution is related to those of
Gottardi and Pavoni (2011) and of papers where ﬁrst-order conditions characterize interactions
betweenexclusiveinsuranceandpublicpolicies(GolosovandTsyvinsky, 2007; ChettyandSaez,
2010).2
In Section 2 we set up the structure of the economy and discuss how ﬁrst-order conditions
may characterize its equilibrium. We show in Section 3 that a given insurance price can be suf-
ﬁciently unfair to imply that individually optimal choices are unique and are characterized by
necessaryandsufﬁcientﬁrst-orderconditions. Section4modelstheinsurancepriceintermsof
the cost structure of insurance production, Section 5 characterizes the resulting general equi-
librium with moral hazard and hidden insurance, and Section 6 discusses how taxes or public
transfers may address its inefﬁciency. Section 7 concludes.
1Ales and Maziero (2009) also model insurance production costs, but assume that each exclusive indi-
vidual insurance contract entails a ﬁxed cost, so that endogenous subsets of the population are perfectly
insured or completely uninsured. Our assumptions instead imply that partial insurance is available to all
of the economy’s (representative) individuals.
2Krueger and Perri (2011) study similar issues in a setting where ﬁnancial market imperfections arise
from limited enforcement rather than from asymmetric information.
42 The problem
We adapt to our purposes the structure of a standard hidden-action problem. Ex-ante identical,
risk-averse individuals experience idiosyncratic income shocks that are observable and veriﬁ-
able but occur with probabilities that depend on unobservable effort. Denoting the intensity of
a hidden effort action with e and realized consumption with c, individual welfare is additively
separable in the disutility ￿v(e) and the expected value of utility u(c). Effort decreases welfare
at an increasing rate,
[C1] v0(e) > 0, v00(e) > 0 8 e > 0:
To focus on interior optima, we assume that v0(0) = 0 and that c can take any value in an open
set, such as the real line, throughout which u(￿) is strictly concave in consumption,3
[C2] u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0 8 c:
We allow for two possible realizations of uncertainty over the single period that in the model
represents the individuals’ lifetime, denoting with ￿ > 0 the size of a possible negative shock.
Individual resources in consumption terms amount to z with probability 1￿f(e), to z ￿￿ with
probability f(e). We assume that
[C3] 0 < f(e) < 1, f0(e) < 0; f00(e) > 0 8 e > 0 :
the probability of each realization is bounded away from zero and one, and this “full-support”
property makes it impossible to infer individual effort from realizations. The strictly negative
ﬁrst derivative implies that moral hazard is always relevant if effort is private information. The
positive second derivative implies that effort encounters decreasing returns in reducing the
probability of negative shocks, which remains bounded above zero for all effort levels.
The economy is populated by individuals who are ex-ante identical and sufﬁciently many
as to make it unnecessary to draw a distinction between the probability and realized frequency
of independently distributed shocks.4 The realization of each individual’s resources is publicly
3One might prefer explicitly to restrict consumption to be non-negative. The optimum would then be
necessarily interior only if the marginal utility of consumption diverges to inﬁnity at zero.
4The logic of our derivations readily extends to similar economies with symmetric information about
heterogeneous factor endowments and/or preferences. In that case, however, Pareto-improving policies
would need to include ex-ante transfers.
5observed. Thus,itispossibletowriteandenforceprivateinsurancecontractswherebypayment
of a premium p entitles to a unit of resources upon realization of the negative shock. Of course,
0 < p < 1 whenever the insurance market is active (otherwise, insurance contracts would entail
a sure loss for one of the parties). Each individual chooses to stipulate q such contracts, taking p
as given. To represent in a stylized way realistic technological or legal constraints on collection
and processing of detailed ﬁnancial transaction information, we assume that each individual’s
q is not publicly observable. Hence, the distribution of realized consumption is inﬂuenced not
only by unobservable effort, but also by similarly hidden insurance purchases.
From each individual’s point of view, the relative price of consumption in the two possible
contingencies is p=(1 ￿ p). From our general equilibrium perspective, p determines the slope
withrespecttoinsuranceofindividualbudgetconstraints, whichalsodependoncontingentre-
source endowments and income from the production side of the economy. In the economy we
model, endowments are parameterized by z and ￿, and the only production that will be of in-
terest is that of insurance services. We allow the insurance production sector of the economy to
generate rental income amounting to ￿ for each of the economy’s ex-ante identical individuals.
This income depends on equilibrium factor prices as in any competitive general equilibrium
economy, in ways that we will not need to make explicit in what follows.
Under the contingent resource constraints
ch = z ￿ qp + ￿; cl = z ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ p)q + ￿ = ch ￿ ￿ + q; (1)
the representative individual’s problem is that of choosing q and e, taking p and ￿ as given, in
such a way as to maximize
U(q;e) = ￿v(e) + (1 ￿ f(e))u(z ￿ qp + ￿) + f(e)u(z ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ p)q + ￿): (2)
In equilibrium the insurance price p and income ￿ depend on the average effort ￿ e, which
determines the probability of claims, and on the average volume ￿ q of insurance transactions,
which is also relevant to general equilibrium prices and incomes if production of insurance
services is costly.5 While p(￿ e; ￿ q) and ￿(￿ e; ￿ q) are taken as given in the individual optimization
5To see this, it may be useful to inspect the economy’s resource constraint when insurance production
is not costly, and aggregate resources equal aggregate consumption at (1 ￿ f(￿ e))z + (z ￿ ￿)f(￿ e) = (1 ￿
f(￿ e))ch + f(￿ e)cl. With (1), this implies that (p ￿ f(￿ e)) ￿ q = ￿, and if actuarially fair insurance is priced at
p = f(￿ e) it must be the case that ￿ = 0. In the more general framework we consider, insurance production
6problem
￿
ey;qy￿
2 argmax
e;q
U(q;e), (3)
in equilibrium it must be the case that (￿ e; ￿ q) =
￿
ey;qy￿
.
Under the differentiability and monotonicity assumptions in [C1-C3], any optimal choice of
effort and insurance must satisfy ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to effort and to insurance:
when e = ey, ch = z ￿ qyp + ￿, and cl = ch ￿ ￿ + qy, then
f0(e)(u(cl) ￿ u(ch)) = v0(e) (4)
and
(1 ￿ f(e))u0 (ch)p = f(e)u0 (cl)(1 ￿ p): (5)
Recalling that cl = ch ￿ ￿ + q, actuarially unfair insurance (f(e) < p < 1) implies that optimal
insurance is positive but partial (0 < q < ￿).
Under additional conditions extensively discussed below, (4) and (5) are sufﬁcient as well
as necessary for individual maximization of (2) subject to (1). Then, they can replace (3) as
constraints of the social welfare maximization problem that satisﬁes equilibrium and individ-
ual optimality conditions when choosing the representative individual’s consumption proﬁle to
maximize (2).
The functional form assumptions [C1-C3] and the ﬁrst-order conditions deﬁne a continu-
ously differentiable mapping between the individual choice variables and the equilibrium val-
ues of p and ￿. If an incentive-compatible equilibrium exists, and differentiable functions e(￿ q),
p(￿ q;e(￿ q)), and ￿(￿ q;e(￿ q)) relate the representative individual’s optimal effort, the price of insur-
ance, and rents to the aggregate insurance amount ￿ q, then the problem
max
￿ q ￿ v(e(￿ q)) + (1 ￿ f(e(￿ q)))u(ch) + f(e(￿ q))u(cl)
s.t. ch = z ￿ qp(￿ q; ￿ e) + ￿(￿ q; ￿ e); cl = ch ￿ ￿ + q
has ﬁrst-order condition
(￿v0(e(￿ q)) ￿ f0(e(￿ q)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl)))
de
d￿ q
+ (1 ￿ f(e(￿ q)))u0 (ch)
dch
d￿ q
+ f(e(￿ q))u0 (cl)
￿
1 +
dch
d￿ q
￿
= 0
costs imply that p > f(￿ e), need to be accounted for in the economy’s resource constraint, and may imply
that ￿ > 0.
7or, using the optimality condition (4) for effort choice at given insurance,
￿(1 ￿ f(e(￿ q))u0 (c￿
h)
dch
d￿ q
= f(e(￿ q))u0 (c￿
l )
￿
1 +
dch
d￿ q
￿
; (6)
where c￿
h and c￿
l denote constrained-efﬁcient consumption levels.
Since effort is not publicly observed and inﬂuences the probability distribution of resources,
the social maximization problem cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best consumption allocation. Less
obviously,theeconomy’scompetitiveequilibriumalsogenerallyfailstoachievethebestincentive-
compatibleandphysicallyfeasiblecombinationofconsumptionsmoothingandeffort,because
competitive trade of insurance securities does not account for the effect of hidden insurance
on effort incentives and aggregate production. By the envelope theorem the variation of effort
caused by changes of insurance has no ﬁrst-order welfare effect through v(￿) and f(￿) but, since
dch
d￿ q
= ￿p(￿ q;e(￿ q)) ￿ ￿ q
dp(￿ q;e(￿ q))
d￿ q
+
d￿(￿ q;e(￿ q))
d￿ q
; (7)
the social efﬁciency condition (6) differs from the individual ﬁrst-order condition (5) when-
ever ￿ q inﬂuences consumption levels not only through individually optimal purchases, priced
at p(￿ q;e(￿ q)), but also through changes of that equilibrium price and of income. It is intuitive,
and will be shown formally below, that no such effect would be present in competitive equilib-
rium if the probability distribution of insurable shocks did not depend on unobservable effort;
when atomistic price-taking behavior fails to internalize the welfare implications of f0(e) < 0,
conversely, then individually optimal consumption proﬁles are inefﬁcient.
Theﬁrst-orderapproachleadingtocharacterizationofthesedistortionsasin(7)isverycon-
venient. It is only valid, however, if hidden actions satisfy ﬁrst-order conditions and a com-
petitive equilibrium exists where endogenous variables are linked to insurance volumes by the
well-behaved functions appearing in the social maximization problem. In what follows we ﬁrst
proceed to derive conditions which make it appropriate to characterize individual choices in
terms of ﬁrst-order conditions. Then, we show how a stylized model of insurance production
lets structural features determine the equilibrium functions appearing in (6) and (7).
83 Validity of the ﬁrst-order approach
For the ﬁrst-order conditions (4) and (5) to be sufﬁcient, it has to be the case not only that
@2U(q;e)=@q2 ￿ 0 and @2U(q;e)=@e2 ￿ 0, or
u00 (cl)f(e)(1 ￿ p)2 + u00(ch)(1 ￿ f(e))p2 ￿ 0, f00(e)(u(cl) ￿ u(ch)) ￿ v00(e) ￿ 0; (8)
but also that
￿
@2U(q;e)=@q2￿￿
@2U(q;e)=@e2￿
￿
￿
@2U(q;e)=@q@e
￿2
￿ 0 or, using (8),
￿
u00 (cl)f(e)(1 ￿ p)2 + u00(ch)(1 ￿ f(e))p2
f0(e)((1 ￿ p)u0(cl) + pu0(ch))
￿ ￿
f0(e)((1 ￿ p)u0(cl) + pu0(ch))
f00(e)(u(cl) ￿ u(ch)) ￿ v00(e)
: (9)
While the inequalities in (8) follow from assumptions [C1], [C2], [C3] for all cl ￿ ch, the cross-
derivative sign restriction in (9) does not (Helpman and Laffont, 1975). As f0(e) 6= 0 and effort
determines the probability distribution of consumption, our assumptions do not imply that
expected utility (2) is a globally concave function of both consumption and effort. When the
localconcavitycondition(9)failstoholdataconsumptionandeffortcombinationthatsatisﬁes
the ﬁrst order conditions, those conditions cannot identify a competitive equilibrium, because
a joint variation of insurance and effort locally increases welfare.
To identify plausible and interpretable restrictions that ensure validity of the ﬁrst-order ap-
proach, we proceed in steps. First, we derive a condition that ensures local concavity of (2)
when consumption responds sufﬁciently strongly to the model’s insurable shock. We proceed
to derive conditions for consumption to respond strongly, and for a locally robust equilibrium
to exist. We will then shown that, even though the objective function may well be non-concave
at allocations where the ﬁrst-order conditions are not satisﬁed, non-local deviations in effort
and insurance cannot, under interpretable conditions, be welfare improving.
As a starting point, we formulate a sufﬁcient condition for local concavity of the objective
function:
Result 1 Given [C1], [C2], [C3], if ch > cl and
p2u00(ch) ￿ (1 ￿ p)2u00(cl)
(pu0(ch) + (1 ￿ p)u0(cl))
2 (u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) ￿
f0(e)2
f00(e)f(e)
(10)
then the expected utility loss ￿f(e)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) is locally concave, and this is sufﬁcient to en-
sure local concavity of the objective function U(q;e) in (2).
Proof. Writing U(q;e) = ￿v(e) + u(ch) ￿ f(e)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) and noting that ￿v(e) is concave in e by
[C1] , u(ch) is concave in q since @
2u(ch)=@q
2 = u
00 (ch)p
2 < 0 by [C2], and sums of concave functions
9are concave, we only need to prove that the conditions imply that ￿f(e)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) is concave or,
equivalently, f(e)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) = f(e)(u(z ￿ qp + ￿) ￿ u(z ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ p)q + ￿)) is convex in q and e.
For ch > cl, the monotone ﬁrst derivative assumption in [C2] ensures that u(ch)￿u(cl) > 0, and therefore
thattheinequalityin(10), wheretheright-handsideispositiveby[C3],impliesu
00(ch)p
2￿u
00(cl)(1￿p)
2 >
0. Hence, both diagonal terms of the Hessian
H =
2
4 f(e)
￿
u
00(ch)p
2 ￿ u
00(cl)(1 ￿ p)
2￿
f
0(e)(￿u
0(ch)p ￿ u
0(cl)(1 ￿ p))
f
0(e)(￿u
0(ch)p ￿ u
0(cl)(1 ￿ p)) f
00(e)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl))
3
5;
are positive. The determinant
jHj = f(e)
￿
u
00(ch)p
2 ￿ u
00(cl)(1 ￿ p)
2￿
f
00(e)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) ￿
￿
f
0(e)
￿
￿u
0(ch)p ￿ u
0(cl)(1 ￿ p)
￿￿2
is also positive if (10) holds.
This result provides sufﬁcient but not necessary conditions for local concavity.6 The condi-
tions are violated when insurance is perfect, and consumption is perfectly stable. With ch = cl
the expected utility loss is zero, but need not be concave if moral hazard is present: when the
left-hand side of (10) is zero, the inequality is violated since [C3] implies that the right-hand
side is strictly positive. When ch > cl instead, and an adverse realization reduces utility, then
the left-hand side of (10) differs from zero and is positive if u00(ch)p2 ￿ u00(cl)(1 ￿ p)2 > 0, i.e. if
u00(ch) is less negative than u00(cl) by a factor that depends on the insurance premium p. Since
concavity fails to hold when joint deviations improve welfare, it is intuitive that decreasing risk
aversion should, by reducing the appeal of deviations that vary effort and insurance in opposite
6To see that the function is necessarily concave when the conditions of Result 1 are satisﬁed, rearrange
(9), using f
0(e) < 0 and u(ch) ￿ u(cl) + v
00(e)=f
00(e) > 0, to obtain
p
2u
00(ch) ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2u
00 (cl) ￿
￿
p
2=f(e)
￿
u
00(ch)
(pu0(ch) + (1 ￿ p)u0(cl))
2
￿
u(ch) ￿ u(cl) +
v
00(e)
f00(e)
￿
￿
f
0(e)
2
f00(e)f(e)
:
the left-hand side of this inequality is larger than that of (10) since v
00(e)=f
00(e) > 0 and
￿
￿
p
2=f(e)
￿
u
00(ch) > 0. To see that (10) is not necessary, note that (9) may be satisﬁed even for complete
insurance if it so happens that
￿
u
00(c)
u0(c)2 ￿
f
0(e)
2
f00(e)f(e)
￿￿
(1 ￿ p)
2 +
1 ￿ f(e)
f(e)
p
2
￿
v
00(e)
f00(e)
￿￿1
;
a condition which depends on consumption and effort levels through all of the model’s functions, and
could only be veriﬁed by evaluating them explicitly.
10directions, play a role in ensuring that the inequality in (10) is satisﬁed.
To exploit this insight formally it will be convenient to let the utility function take the hyper-
bolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) form
[C2’] u(c) = ￿
￿
￿ + c
￿
￿1￿￿
; with (1 ￿ ￿)￿ > 0.
This makes it possible to write the function of consumption levels on the left-hand side of (10)
as a function of the marginal-utility ratio:7
￿
￿ ￿ 1
p2 u
00(ch)
u00(cl) ￿ (1 ￿ p)2
￿
p
u0(ch)
u0(cl) + (1 ￿ p)
￿2
￿
u(ch)
u(cl)
￿ 1
￿
￿ g
￿
u0(cl)
u0(ch)
￿
: (11)
The following properties of this function will be useful in proving our results:
Result 2 For the function
g(￿) ￿
p2￿￿
1+￿
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)2
(p￿￿1 + (1 ￿ p))
2
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
(12)
(i) g0(￿) > 0 for ￿ > 1 and g(￿) > 0 if ￿ > 0,
(ii) g(￿) < 1 for all ￿ > 0 if ￿ = ￿1 < 0 or ￿ ! 1,
(iii) lim￿!1 g(￿) > 1 if 0 < ￿ < 1.
7To see this, note that
p
2u
00(ch) ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2u
00(cl)
(pu0(ch) + (1 ￿ p)u0(cl))
2 (u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) =
u
00(cl)u(cl)
(u0(cl))
2
p
2 u00(ch)
u00(cl) ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2
￿
p
u0(ch)
u0(cl) + (1 ￿ p)
￿2
￿
u(ch)
u(cl)
￿ 1
￿
and that for HARA utility
u(ch)
u(cl)
=
 ￿
￿ +
ch
￿
￿￿￿
￿
￿ +
cl
￿
￿￿￿
!￿ 1￿￿
￿
=
￿
u
0(cl)
u0(ch)
￿ 1￿￿
￿
,
u
00(ch)
u00(cl)
=
￿
u
0(cl)
u0(ch)
￿￿ 1+￿
￿
;
u
00(c)u(c)
(u0(c))
2 =
￿￿
1￿￿
￿
￿
￿ +
c
￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿
￿
￿ +
c
￿
￿1￿￿
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿
￿
￿ +
c
￿
￿￿￿￿2 =
￿
￿ ￿ 1
if ￿ 6= 1. In the ￿ = 1 logarithmic utility case, u
00(cl)u(cl)=u
0(cl)
2 = ￿lncl and the function deﬁned in (11)
takes the form
g(￿) = ￿
p
2￿
￿2 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2
(p￿￿1 + (1 ￿ p))
2 ln￿,
with ￿ ￿ u
0(cl)=u
0(ch), and has the same properties as other HARA functions with 0 < ￿ < 1.
11Proof. (i) Writing g(￿) = ^ g(￿)
￿
￿￿1
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
for ^ g(￿) =
p2￿
￿ 1+￿
￿ ￿(1￿p)2
(p￿￿1+(1￿p))
2 , and noting that
^ g
0(￿) = ^ g(￿)
￿
￿
1+￿
￿
￿
p2￿
￿ 1
￿ ￿2
p2￿
￿ 1+￿
￿ ￿(1￿p)2
￿
+ 2
p￿￿2
(p￿￿1+(1￿p))
￿
,
g
0(￿) = ^ g
0(￿)
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿ ^ g(￿)￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿1
= g(￿)
 
￿
1 + ￿
￿
p
2￿
￿(
1
￿ +2)
p2￿￿ 1+￿
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)2
+ 2
p￿
￿2
(p￿￿1 + (1 ￿ p))
+
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿1
￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
!
is positive when g(￿) > 0 implies p
2￿
￿ 1+￿
￿ ￿(1￿p)
2 < 0, and ￿ > 1 and ￿ > 0 imply
￿
1￿￿
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
> 0.
(ii) For ￿ = ￿1, we have
g(￿) =
1
2
(2p ￿ 1)
￿
￿
￿2 ￿ 1
￿
￿ p
￿ + (1 ￿ p)
￿2 ;
which has a global maximum of 0.5 at ￿ = (p ￿ 1)=p < 0, and never exceeds unity. For ￿ ! 1 we have
lim
￿!1
g(￿) =
p
2￿
￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2
(p￿￿1 + (1 ￿ p))
2
￿
￿
￿1 ￿ 1
￿
= 1 ￿
1
(p￿￿1 + (1 ￿ p))
2 ￿
< 1 8￿ > 0:
These expressions establish that
lim
￿!1
g(￿) =
8
> <
> :
1
2
1￿2p
(1￿p)2 < 0:5 for ￿ = ￿1;
1 ￿
1
(p￿￿1+(1￿p))
2￿ < 1 for ￿ ! 1;
while
(iii)
lim
￿!1
g(￿) =
8
<
:
1 for 0 < ￿ ￿ 1,
￿
￿￿1 > 1 for 1 < ￿ < 1.
The behavior of g(￿) as ￿ grows above unity depends on ￿, the parameter that determines
whetherabsoluteriskaversionincreasesordecreaseswithconsumption.8 Astheoptimalamount
of insurance becomes more partial and ￿ increases further above unity, for ￿ > 0 the left-hand
side of inequality (10) becomes more positive (if it already is). To ensure local concavity at the
optimum, it should exceed the positive right hand side of that condition. The right-hand side is
bounded below unity if we strengthen [C3] to
[C3’] 0 < f(e) < 1, f0(e) < 0, and f(e) is log-convex: f00(e)f(e)f0(e)￿2 ￿ 1,
8Absolute risk aversion ￿u
00(c)=u
0(c) =
￿
￿ +
c
￿
￿￿1 is a decreasing function of c when 0 < ￿ < 1; it is
constant when ￿ ! 1 yields u(c) = ￿￿ exp(c=￿), and increasing if, for example, ￿ = ￿1 yields quadratic
utility (see e.g. Gollier, 2001).
12to imply that higher effort encounters strongly diminishing returns in reducing the probability
of adverse realizations.
Result 2 shows that g(￿) cannot exceed unity if ￿ ! 1 implies constant absolute risk aver-
sion, or if ￿ = ￿1 so that utility is quadratic and absolute risk aversion is increasing. When
0 < ￿ < 1 implies decreasing risk aversion, conversely, it is possible for insurance to be so
incomplete that individual ﬁrst-order conditions can only hold where the objective function is
locally concave, and that a unique consumption and effort combination solves the maximiza-
tion problem. To see this, note that when the ﬁrst-order condition (5) for insurance holds, the
argument of g(￿) is
u0(cl)
u0(ch)
=
1 ￿ f(e)
f(e)
p
1 ￿ p
￿ ￿(e;p). (13)
Since ￿(e;p) = 1 when p = f(e) and g(1) = 0 for all admissible values of ￿, using (11) and (13)
in (10) conﬁrms that (10) is violated under full insurance. To establish that actuarially unfair
insurance can ensure local concavity at all allocations that satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition for
insurance, note that the expression in (13) exceeds unity when f(e) < p and that, since 0 <
f(e) < 1 and 0 < p < 1, it is increasing in e for given p when f0(e) < 0 as in [C3] implies
moral hazard. Intuitively, higher effort decreases the probability of loss and makes it optimal to
buy less insurance at an interior optimum, so that a loss realization has larger implications for
marginal utility. We then can show:
Proposition 1 Given [C1], [C2’], [C3’], if absolute risk aversion is decreasing then p can exceed
f(0) by a sufﬁciently large amount to ensure that the objective function (2) is concave for all con-
sumption patterns that satisfy interior ﬁrst-order conditions.
Proof. The right-hand side of the local concavity condition (10) is bounded below unity by [C3’] for all e.
Its left-hand side is bounded above unity at e = 0 by the ﬁrst-order condition for insurance choice (13) if
g
￿
1 ￿ f(0)
f(0)
p
1 ￿ p
￿
￿ 1; (14)
where as deﬁned in (12)
g(￿) ￿
p
2￿
￿ 1+￿
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2
(p￿￿1 + (1 ￿ p))
2
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
:
13ByResult2(iii), condition(14)canbesatisﬁedforaﬁnitevalueoftheg(￿)function’sargumentif0 < ￿ < 1
and risk aversion is decreasing. Since by Result 2(i) for ￿ > 0 we have that g
0 (￿) > 0 when g (￿) > 0 and
￿ > 1, and the right-hand side of (13) increases with e for f
0(e) < 0 as in [C3’],
g
￿
1 ￿ f(e)
f(e)
p
1 ￿ p
￿
> g
￿
1 ￿ f(0)
f(0)
p
1 ￿ p
￿
￿ 1 for all e > 0: (15)
Hence, (14) ensures that the inequality in (10) is satisﬁed for all e > 0 when (13) holds. By Result 1 this is
sufﬁcienttoensurelocalconcavityatallsuchpoints. Thiscanalsobeprovednotingthattheleft-handside
of (15) exceeds 1 if u(￿) has HARA form and u(ch) ￿ u(cl) is log-convex, that log-convexity is preserved by
multiplication, and that convexity of the potentially problematic f(e)(u(ch) ￿ u(cl)) expected utility loss
ensures concavity of the individual objective function.
Proposition 1 does not establish global concavity of the objective function, nor its quasi-
concavity. Its conditions only restrict the shape of the expected utility loss term f(e)(u(ch) ￿
u(cl),astheshapeoftheeffortcostfunctionv(￿)convenientlyplaysnoroleinthesufﬁcientlocal
concavity condition (10) of Result 1. They include not only the plausible and familiar curvature
assumptions [C2’] and [C3’] and decreasing risk aversion, but also the requirement that the
probability f(0) of loss when there is no effort be sufﬁciently smaller than the insurance price
p. The proof ﬁrst uses Result 1 to show that when the insurance price is unfair and (13) holds,
the ratio ￿(e;p) of the marginal utilities in the two states can be large enough to ensure local
concavity at e = 0. With v0(0) = 0, optimal effort cannot be zero when the price of insurance is
actuarially unfair, and optimal insurance is only partial. But at all points where the insurance
ﬁrst order condition (13) is satisﬁed, the marginal-utility ratio ￿(e;p) is larger for e > 0 than for
e = 0, and with decreasing risk aversion Result 2 ensures that the objective function must be
locally concave at all such points.
When Proposition 1’s assumptions are satisﬁed, the solution of the individual maximization
problem is found at an interior point and is characterized by ﬁrst-order conditions. The ob-
jective function may be non-concave elsewhere, but this is not problematic for the ﬁrst-order
approach. To see this note that since [C1-3] implies continuity of individual choices, the objec-
14Figure1: Invalidityoftheﬁrst-orderapproachifconditionsofProposition1areviolated. Source:
Authors’ calculation. Notes: We make the following parametric assumptions: u(c) = (c1￿￿ ￿
1)=(1￿￿),v(e) = (1=￿)e￿,f(e) = ￿ exp(￿￿2e=(1+￿e)). Theparametervaluesare￿ = 2,￿ = 1:05,
￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 1:5, the endowment is z + ￿ = 1 and the size of the loss is ￿ = 0:5.
tive function cannot have multiple interior local optima unless local minima or saddle-points
also exist where the ﬁrst-order conditions hold at non-concave points of the objective function.
But if the conditions of Proposition 1 hold, then the ﬁrst-order conditions can only be satisﬁed
at points where the objective function is locally concave. Thus, there can only be a single local
maximum, which must coincide with the global maximum since assumptions [C1-3] rule out
corner maxima where ﬁrst-order conditions do not hold.
It is possible to specify conditions that are less stringent, but also less general and trans-
parent than the sufﬁcient condition g(￿) ￿ 1 in Proposition 1. It may be of interest to note that
whenabsoluteriskaversionisconstanttheng(￿)ismonotonicandthederivationsinResult2(ii)
establish that, while strictly less than unitary for ￿ > 1, g(￿) is positive if p < 0:5, and may exceed
f0(e)2=(f00(e)f(e)) if additional functional form restrictions ensure that the latter is strictly less
than unitary and suitably small.9 More generally, the contingent price p need not exceed f(0) so
9Functions in the form f(e) = ￿ exp(￿￿(e)) have the properties listed in [C3’] if ￿ exp(￿￿(0)) < 1,
lime!1 ￿ exp(￿￿(e)) > 0, ￿
0(e) > 0 and ￿
00(e) ￿ 0 for all 0 ￿ e. While f
0(e)
2=(f
00(e)f(e)) = 1 when ￿(e)
15much as to satisfy the sufﬁcient condition (14) if v(e) is strongly convex at low levels of e.
Figure 1 illustrates how a violation of Proposition 1’s sufﬁcient conditions may make it inap-
propriate to rely on the ﬁrst-order condition, under parametric assumptions that do not allow
other sources of concavity to compensate for that violation. The left panel shows that effort re-
duces the probability of a loss, which is the source of the moral hazard problem, and that the
price of insurance is ﬁxed at p = f(0), hence it is actuarially fair if the agent exerts no effort. The
right panel of the ﬁgure plots the function g(￿), which does not depend on effort and should be
larger than unity as a condition of Proposition 1, but in this parametric example is lower than
unity for all q 2 [0;￿]. Thus, concavity of the objective function is not guaranteed for combi-
nations of effort and insurance which satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions. Indeed, as shown in the
middlepanel,theﬁrst-orderconditionsaresatisﬁedfortwodifferentcombinationsofeffortand
insurance in Figure 1. The loci that satisfy the insurance and effort ﬁrst-order conditions cross
at an interior partial insurance point, but also at e = 0 and q = 0:5: this is on the border of the
choice set, but is not ruled out by v0(0) = 0 when insurance is actuarially fair. In the numerical
example, the objective function’s maximum is at the latter point. That relatively uninteresting
zero-effort, full-insurance competitive equilibrium, however, cannot exist if actuarially fair in-
surance is not available, as is realistic, and may be rationalized by insurance production costs.
4 Production of insurance services
Having established that price-taking behavior can support a competitive equilibrium with suf-
ﬁciently incomplete insurance, we proceed to consider how partial insurance may in turn be
implied in equilibrium by costly production of insurance services.
We do not allow non-intermediated trade in individual-speciﬁc securities. As individuals
is linear, other functional forms can imply a lower upper bound: for example, if ￿(e) = ￿
2e=(1 + ￿e) then
f
0(0)
2=(f
00(0)f(0)) = ￿=(￿ + 1) at zero effort, and declines to zero as effort diverges to inﬁnity.
16can only take long positions in contingent securities, the conditions derived above for local
concavity of their objective function only need to be satisﬁed at ﬁrst-order conditions with 0 <
q.10
We model a standard competitive industry of intermediaries that diversify idiosyncratic risk
by holding a representative portfolio of non-exclusive unit insurance contracts, and charge ac-
tuarially unfair premia because issuing such contracts and/or processing the resulting claims
is costly. Any positive and weakly increasing intermediation cost function may ensure that in-
surance is sufﬁciently incomplete to fulﬁll the key condition of Proposition 1. For our purpose
of characterizing equilibria by inspection and manipulation of interior ﬁrst-order conditions,
however, it is convenient to make assumptions that ensure that optimal insurance is positive
but partial (0 < q < ￿, f(e) < p < 1 for any e > 0). To this end, we suppose that the marginal
cost m(x) of processing x individual contingent claims is differentiable, increasing, and unitary
at x = 0:
[C4] m(0) = 1, m(x) > 0 8x, m0(x) > 0 8x,
so that the average cost of processing claims and payments depends on their amount according
to
a(x) ￿
R x
0 m(y)dy
x
; a(0) = 1; (16)
a0(x) = (m(x) ￿ a(x))
1
x
; 0 < a0(x) < m0 (x):
The marginal and average unit cost of contingent payouts are unitary at x = 0 and smoothly
grow above unity for x > 0. While inﬁnitesimally small insurance would allow intermediaries
to issue actuarially fair contracts, the cost of processing strictly positive amounts of contingent
securities exceeds unity: this represents realistic processing or veriﬁcation costs, and implies
10To see the relationship between our economy’s and Bisin and Gottardi’s (1999) equilibrium existence
conditions it may also be helpful to note that, if short positions in contingent assets were allowed, the
functional form assumption we make below would imply strictly positive bid-ask spreads.
17that equilibrium insurance premia are actuarially unfair.
Idiosyncratic uncertainty cancels out in the customer base of intermediaries who trade with
a large number of individuals. Then, proﬁt maximization implies that the competitive price
p(￿) of a contract for delivery of a unit of goods upon realization of the negative shock should
equal its expected marginal cost. In a symmetric competitive equilibrium with N insurance
intermediaries, where the probability of payoff is f(￿ e) and each intermediary is issuing x = ￿ q=N
contracts, this is
p(￿ q; ￿ e) = f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N): (17)
By[C4],p(￿ q; ￿ e) > f(￿ e)if ￿ q=N > 0,i.e.,ifeachintermediaryoperatesataﬁnitelylargescale. Toen-
surethis, andtorule outnon-intermediatedtrade, we supposethatorganization ofrisk-sharing
entails a ﬁxed ￿ > 0 cost. Then, the unit insurance premium exceeds the average expected cost
f(￿ e)a(￿ q=N), and each intermediary’s revenues exceed costs by
￿
￿ ￿ q
N
; ￿ e
￿
= f(￿ e)
￿
m
￿ ￿ q
N
￿
￿ a
￿ ￿ q
N
￿￿ ￿ q
N
￿ ￿: (18)
Since @￿(x; ￿ e)=@x = f(￿ e)xm0 (x) > 0 by (16) and ￿(0; ￿ e) = ￿￿ < 0, the free entry condition
￿(￿ q=N; ￿ e) = 0uniquelydetermines ￿ q=N foreach ￿ e; asN adjuststoensurethatinsuranceservices
are produced at the zero-proﬁt efﬁcient scale for every ￿ q, returns to scale are constant. If the per
capita number of intermediaries N is given instead, then each of N ﬁrms pays rents amounting
to (18) to the economy’s representative individuals, and returns to scale are decreasing at the
level of the aggregate insurance industry.
It is not necessary for our purposes to spell out the microeconomic structure that underlies
the cost functions introduced in this section. We measure insurance production costs in terms
of consumable resources but, as long as no additional asymmetric-information issues arise in
production, it would be simple (and trivial if leisure is perfectly substitutable to consumption
in individual utility functions) to express ﬁxed and variable insurance services in terms of la-
bor. The decreasing returns to scale implied by a parametrically given number of ﬁrms can be
18explained in fully standard fashion by use in production of insurance services of a scarce fac-
tor, such as managerial ability, that is owned by the economy’s representative individuals and is
compensated by the amount that, in equilibrium, corresponds to (18).
For our general equilibrium analysis it is instead crucial to characterize the partial deriva-
tives with respect to ￿ q and ￿ e of the total cost of insurance production by the N intermediaries,
k(￿ q; ￿ e) ￿ f(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q + ￿N: (19)
Itissimpletoverifyusing(16)that, regardlessofwhetherN isﬁxedorvariestokeep￿(￿ q=N; ￿ e) =
0,
@
@q
k(￿ q; ￿ e) = f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N) = p(￿ q; ￿ e) > 0;
@
@e
k(￿ q; ￿ e) = f0(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q < 0: (20)
the marginal cost of more insurance at given effort corresponds to the insurance premium;
moreeffortatgiveninsurancereducestheincidenceofnegativeshocksandthetotalcosta(￿ q=N) ￿ q
of insurance services.
5 Hidden insurance in general equilibrium
We proceed to deﬁne and study the general equilibrium implied by the insurance demand and
supply relationships introduced and characterized above.
Deﬁnition 1 In competitive equilibrium,
(i) effort ey and insurance qy solve the individual maximization problem and satisfy (4), (5) for
given p(￿ q; ￿ e), ￿(￿ q; ￿ e);
(ii) price-taking intermediaries maximize proﬁts, so that p = f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N) by (17) and, by (18),
￿ = f(￿ e)(m(￿ q=N) ￿ a(￿ q=N))￿ q ￿ ￿N, where N may either be parametrically given or ensure that
￿ = 0 under free entry;
(iii) equilibrium effort and insurance coincide with individual choices, so that
￿
ey;qy￿
= (￿ e; ￿ q):
19Part (i) of the deﬁnition encompasses the requirement that the ﬁrst-order approach is valid
which,asdiscussedbelow,canbeestablishedunderreasonableandinterpretableconditionson
the basis of Section 3’s analytical results. Part (ii) recognizes that any difference between well-
diversiﬁed insurers’ revenues and costs should appear as ￿ in individual budget constraints,
which ensures physical feasibility of the equilibrium. Aggregating (1), the economy’s resource
constraint reads
(1 ￿ f(￿ e))z + f(￿ e)(z ￿ ￿) ￿ ((1 ￿ f(￿ e))ch + f(￿ e)cl) = ￿N + f(￿ e)(a(￿ q=N) ￿ 1) ￿ q
in equilibrium, and appropriately accounts for the fact that aggregate resources should cover
not only aggregate consumption, but also the cost of insurance services production.11
Inserting (17) and (18) in (1), it is also straightforward to verify that
ch = z ￿ (f(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q + ￿N) = z ￿ k(￿ q; ￿ e) : (21)
asinanycompetitivegeneralequilibrium,insurancerevenuesarerebatedtotherepresentative
individual, whose consumption level is reduced by production costs. This simple relationship
is key to characterization of the derivatives in (7), and of the wedge that equilibrium effects
introduce between the individual and social optimality conditions.
In an equilibrium where e = ￿ e and q = ￿ q, the effort ﬁrst-order condition (4) holds and, using
(21), reads
f0(￿ e)(u(z ￿ ￿ + q ￿ k(￿ q; ￿ e)) ￿ u(z ￿ k(￿ q; ￿ e)) = v0(￿ e); (22)
the ﬁrst-order condition for insurance (13) also holds and, using (17), reads
u0 (z ￿ ￿ + ￿ q ￿ k(￿ q; ￿ e))
u0 (z ￿ k(￿ q; ￿ e))
=
m(￿ q=N)(1 ￿ f(￿ e))
1 ￿ f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N)
: (23)
11For readers familiar with the pooled securities notion introduced in Bisin and Gottardi (1999) it may
be helpful to note that, in the tractable economy we study, ￿ similarly represents the returns earned by the
aggregate counterparts of individual asset trades.
20We can show that condition (23) and the functional form assumption [C4], made in Section
4, imply that insurance is positive and partial at the equilibrium crossing point of demand and
supply relationships:
Result 3 For any ￿ > 0, [C4] implies that individually optimal equilibrium insurance ￿ q lies
between 0 and ￿.
Proof. Recalling that cl = ch ￿ ￿ + ￿ q, concave utility as in [C2] implies that the left-hand side of (23) is
a monotonically decreasing function of q for any ch. Its value is u
0 (ch ￿ ￿)=u
0 (ch) > 1 at q = 0, unity at
q = ￿. Theright-handsideof(23)isunitaryatq = 0sincem(0) = 1by[C4]. Itincreasesinq > 0, diverging
to inﬁnity as p(￿) = f(e)m(q=N) ! 1, with slope
d
d(q=N)
￿
m(q=N)
1 ￿ f(e)
1 ￿ f(e)m(q=N)
￿
= m
0 (q=N)
1 ￿ f(e)
(1 ￿ f(e)m(q=N))
2 > 0
where the inequality follows for any q and e from m
0 (x) > 0 for x > 0 by [C4]. At any effort and for
any equilibrium p(￿ q; ￿ e) and ￿(￿ q; ￿ e), therefore, (13) is satisﬁed by a unique level of equilibrium insurance
￿ q 2 (0;￿).
Aslongastheﬁrstandsecond-orderconditionofoptimalityforindividualchoicesbothhold
at the equilibrium, it is also possible to show that equilibrium effort is quite intuitively lower
when more insurance is available:
Result 4 The individually optimal equilibrium effort ey = ￿ e is negatively related to equilibrium
insurance volume ￿ q:
d￿ e
d￿ q
=
￿f0(￿ e)@ [u(cl) ￿ u(ch)]=@q
f00(￿ e)(u(cl) ￿ u(ch)) ￿ v00(￿ e) + f0(￿ e)@ [u(cl) ￿ u(ch)]=@e
< 0:
Proof. The ﬁrst equalityfollows from total differentiation of the ﬁrst-order condition (22) for effort choice
at given insurance, with e = ￿ e. To establish the sign of the resulting expression, note that the numerator is
positive since ￿f
0(￿ e) > 0 by [C3] and
@ [u(cl) ￿ u(ch)]
@q
= u
0(cl)
￿
1 ￿
@
@q
k(￿ q; ￿ e)
￿
￿ u
0(ch)
￿
￿
@
@q
k(￿ q; ￿ e)
￿
> 0
(more insurance reduces the welfare implications of negative shocks in equilibrium): formally, by (20)
moreinsurancedecreasesch bytheinsurancepremium
@
@qk(￿ q; ￿ e) = f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N),whichcannotexceedthe
unitary payoff of insurance contracts. The denominator is negative since f
00(￿ e)(u(cl) ￿ u(ch))￿v
00(￿ e) < 0
21by the second order condition for individual effort choice, f
0(￿ e) < 0 by [C3], and
@ [u(cl) ￿ u(ch)]
@e
=
￿
u
0(cl) ￿ u
0(ch)
￿
￿
￿
@
@e
k(￿ q; ￿ e)
￿
> 0
follows from u
0(cl) > u
0(ch) by [C2] when cl < ch, and
@
@ek(￿ q; ￿ e) = f
0(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q < 0 by (20).
This useful and intuitive pair of results requires sufﬁciency of the ﬁrst-order conditions,
which by Proposition 1 is ensured in equilibrium by a condition in the form
g
￿
1 ￿ f(0)
f(0)
f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N)
1 ￿ f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N)
￿
￿ 1, (24)
where g(￿), as deﬁned in (12), depends on the equilibrium price p(￿ q; ￿ e) = f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N) as well as
on the risk aversion parameter ￿ > 0, and is monotonically increasing in its argument. Condi-
tion (24) need not be satisﬁed for every economy of the type we model, and does not explicitly
constrain the model’s functional parameters, but it does provide useful analytical insights as
regards features of the economic environment that support existence of a nontrivial equilib-
rium with positive effort and partial non-exclusive insurance. The demand for costly insurance,
whichdependsonriskaversionandontheprobabilityandsizeofthenegativeshock, shouldbe
strong enough as to ensure that the equilibrium marginal cost m(￿ q=N) at which intermediaries
supply insurance exceeds unity by a sufﬁciently large margin.
Whether condition (24) is satisﬁed also depends on the extent of moral hazard. To see this,
notethatinsuranceispositiveinequilibriumbyResult3and,byResult4,optimaleffortisthere-
fore lower than the level ~ e implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition (4) evaluated at zero
insurance. Since ~ e is positive and ﬁnite under [C1-C3], 0 < f(~ e) < f(￿ e) < 1, and the argument
of g(￿) in (24) is monotonically decreasing in f(￿ e), the inequality in (24) is certainly satisﬁed if
g
￿
1 ￿ f(0)
f(0)
f(~ e)m(￿ q=N)
1 ￿ f(~ e)m(￿ q=N)
￿
￿ 1.
While a small f(0) helps to ensure that price-taking individuals’ choice problems are well de-
ﬁned as in Proposition 1, this sufﬁcient condition for the validity of the ﬁrst-order approach in
general equilibrium is more easily satisﬁed when f(~ e) is large: quite intuitively, in establishing
22existence of a competitive non-exclusive insurance it is helpful to suppose that positive effort
does not much reduce the loss probability, so that the moral hazard problem implied by the
negative slope of f(e) is not severe.
We now move on to derive the implications of a hypothetical (or, as discussed in the next
section, policy-induced) change in the insurance quantity q. The unambiguously negative rela-
tionship between equilibrium effort and insurance established in Result 4 plays a crucial role in
our ﬁrst-order approach to characterization of the equilibrium’s constrained inefﬁciency:
Proposition 2 In competitive general equilibrium, the social cost of insurance, as measured by
the negative effect of insurance on consumption levels, is larger than the marginal cost of insur-
ance for individuals:
dch
d￿ q
=
dcl
d￿ q
￿ 1 = ￿p(￿ q; ￿ e) ￿ f0(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q
d￿ e
d￿ q
< ￿p(￿ q; ￿ e): (25)
Proof. Recognizing that in equilibrium ￿￿ qp(￿ q; ￿ e) + ￿(￿ q; ￿ e) = ￿k(￿ q; ￿ e), and using (20), the total derivative
(7) of consumption levels with respect to ￿ q is
￿p(￿ q; ￿ e) ￿ ￿ q
dp(￿ q; ￿ e)
d￿ q
+
d￿(￿ q; ￿ e)
d￿ q
= ￿p(￿ q; ￿ e) ￿ f
0(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q
d￿ e
d￿ q
.
(25) follows noting that f
0(e) < 0 by [C3], and d￿ e=d￿ q < 0 by Result 4.
As in Pauly’s (1974) partial equilibrium and Helpman and Laffont’s (1975) general equilib-
rium with actuarially fair contracts, insurance is too cheap in the economy we model. While
exclusiveinsurancecouldallowthepriceofinsurancetodependoneachindividual’sincentives
to provide effort, the anonymity of atomistic competitive trade implies that the price quoted by
each insurance provider takes effort and probabilities as given. It fails to account for the effect
of additional insurance on the payoff probability and on the cost of other providers’ insurance
services. Recalling (5) and (6), inequality (25) readily implies that the socially optimal marginal
utilityratioislargerthantheratioimpliedbyprice-takingindividualoptimization. Inacompet-
itive equilibrium when competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries issue non-exclusive unit contracts,
consumption’s reaction to the resource shock is too small. The representative individual pays
23themarginalcostofinsurancebutneglectsitseffect,throughchangesineffort,onconsumption
and insurance production costs.
In (25), the pecuniary externality ￿f0(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q (d￿ e=d￿ q) is the product of f0(e) < 0, times
insurance production costs, times the intuitively negative effort effect of insurance shown for-
mally by Result 4. The ﬁrst and third term are key to establishing constrained inefﬁciency. In
the model (and arguably in reality), insurance production costs explain why insurance is only
partial, and do need to be taken into account when, as in the next section, an inefﬁcient com-
petitive equilibrium is viewed from the standpoint of society.
By themselves, however, production costs do not imply any inefﬁciency. Competitive insur-
ance trade neglects its own effect on the equilibrium prices, and on the rents paid by the in-
surance sector when its use of a speciﬁc factor restricts entry. This pecuniary externality would
not imply any inefﬁciency, however, in the absence of moral hazard. If f0(￿ e) = 0, in fact, then
f0(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q (d￿ e=d￿ q) = 0 regardless of whether a(￿ q=N) > 1 because insurance production is
costly.12 Conversely, insurance is costless and complete in our model if a(x) = 1 for all x but the
competitive equilibrium, should it exist, would be constrained-inefﬁcient as long as f0(￿ e) < 0.
6 On policies
In our simple moral hazard economy we have shown that a competitive equilibrium with in-
complete non-exclusive or “hidden” insurance can exist, and that it is not efﬁcient when con-
sumption levels are inﬂuenced by equilibrium effort and prices through channels that individ-
ual choices fail to internalize. The equilibrium’s efﬁciency may however be improved if society,
12Costly insurance production is a novel and non-standard feature of our model, but it is very much in
the spirit of the remark by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986, p. 259) that “referring to economies with incom-
plete markets and incomplete information as ‘imperfect’ seems to be wrong: we do not refer to economies
inwhich inputsarerequired toproduceoutputs as‘imperfect’; andthe costsofobtaining informationand
running markets are no less real costs than other forms of production costs.”
24while unable to observe individual insurance quantities, does observe transaction prices and
can enforce taxes or activate a public insurance scheme alongside the private non-exclusive
insurance market.
6.1 Taxes
As in Helpman and Laffont (1975), taxation of observable insurance transactions may address
the inefﬁciency identiﬁed by Proposition 2. When each insurance contract is subject to a unit
tax ￿, individuals pay a premium
p = f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N) + ￿
and, in general equilibrium, their resource constraints include tax revenues:
￿ = f(￿ e)(m(￿ q=N) ￿ q ￿ a(￿ q=N)) ￿ ￿N + ￿￿ q:
Comparing (6) and (5), we see that a Pigouvian tax amounting to
￿ = ￿ q
dp(￿ q;e(￿ q))
d￿ q
￿
d￿(￿ q;e(￿ q))
d￿ q
= f0(￿ e)a(￿ q=N) ￿ q
d￿ e
d￿ q
> 0
aligns the marginal utility ratio implied by the individual ﬁrst-order condition to that required
by social efﬁciency.
In asymmetric-information economies, it is generally difﬁcult to show that this or other
equivalent indirect mechanisms may implement the socially optimal allocation: taxes and sub-
sidiescanerasethewedgebetweenindividualandsocialoptimalityconditionsonlyiftheecon-
omy’s choice problem is locally concave when the ﬁrst-order conditions are satisﬁed. In our
economy, however, local concavity is preserved when insurance becomes more incomplete
than required by Proposition 1’s sufﬁcient conditions. Hence, positive taxation of insurance
premia can improve efﬁciency of a decentralized competitive equilibrium that remains well
deﬁned if insurance is sufﬁciently incomplete. In reality, as in our Section 4, this may be ra-
25tionalized by costly production of insurance services: according to various issues of the OECD
Insurance Statistics Yearbook, between 1996 and 2005 operating expenses amounted to about
one third of private non-life insurance claims in advanced countries. While it is easy to estab-
lish that the equilibrium is inefﬁcient in the absence of speciﬁc insurance taxes, it is much more
difﬁcult to assess the welfare implications of those that do exist in reality (e.g. in the United
Kingdom, where an Insurance Premium Tax at rates between 6% and 20% is imposed on com-
mon non-life insurance contracts). To do so, one would need to estimate the optimal tax rates
that in our simple economy could in principle be computed evaluating the derivatives appear-
ing in the proof of Proposition 2, and might in future research be investigated in the context of
more realistic models.13
6.2 Public transfers
Next,weconsiderwhetherandhowinsurancemaybeinﬂuencedbyapubliccontingenttaxand
transfer scheme that pays a possibly negative amount s to all individuals who experience the
veriﬁable negative shock. If the transfers and the scheme’s administration costs are funded by
a lump-sum levy or rebate T(f(e)s), such that T(0) = 0 and T0(￿) > 0, contingent consumption
levels are given by
ch = z ￿ qp + ￿; cl = ch ￿ ￿ + s + q;
where ￿ = f(￿ e)(m(￿ q=N) ￿ a(￿ q=N)) ￿ q ￿ ￿N ￿ T(f(e)s).
When free entry in production of insurance services implies constant returns, at given effort
the private insurance premium p = f(￿ e)m(￿ q=N) is not affected by the scheme. Hence, public
transfers crowd out private insurance fully unless they change effort through income effects.
13In such work it may also be useful to recognize that when multiple consumption goods are (like
torchesandﬁreextinguishers)differentlyassociatedwithbehaviorthataffectstheprobabilityofaccidents
then, as shown by Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986, Section II.D), commodity
taxes can implement allocations that are Pareto-superior to a laissez-faire competitive equilibrium (if one
exists) with moral hazard and actuarially fair insurance.
26A public contingent transfers scheme can in fact inﬂuence effort and insurance when its cost
structure differs from that of private insurance, as may be realistic since OECD (2004) data re-
port “tax administration costs per net revenue collection” of only about 5%. If the cost of public
insurance is lower than that of private insurance then public transfers affect average consump-
tionlevelsand,withu000(￿) > 0,equilibriuminsuranceandeffortthroughtheresultingchangein
local risk aversion. The implications of public insurance schemes are more complex, but quali-
tatively similar, when decreasing returns in the insurance industry let public transfers inﬂuence
the equilibrium price of insurance.14
The welfare impact of such a scheme can be characterized in terms of ﬁrst-order condi-
tions as long as Proposition 1 applies, which is the case if its conditions hold at s = 0 and
transfers do not imply smoother marginal utility. The efﬁciency objectives appropriate for the
representative-individual economy we study in this paper would indeed call for the scheme
to reduce the excessive consumption smoothing delivered by non-exclusive competitive insur-
ance transactions. While in reality redistribution policies also pursue a variety of other objec-
tives, this may explain some of the cross-country variation of public and private insurance dis-
cussed in Bertola and Koeniger (2010).
7 Concluding comments
If insurance against a negative shock is sufﬁciently incomplete in a single period economy with
twopossiblerealizationsofuncertainty,wehaveshownthatacompetitiveequilibriumcanexist
and be characterized by ﬁrst-order conditions in the presence of both hidden effort and hidden
non-exclusiveinsurancecontracts. Whilethevalidityoftheﬁrst-orderapproachinasymmetric-
informationgeneral-equilibriummodelswithmultiplestatesandhiddenassetsremainsachal-
14In a microfounded general equilibrium model of public and private insurance, the economy’s tech-
nology and/or its endowments of sector-speciﬁc factors would determine in standard fashion the cost
structure of private and public insurance provision.
27lenge for future research, our analytical derivations characterize an appealing equilibrium that
issupportedunderstandardfunctionalformassumptionsbyrealisticallyincompleteinsurance.
As in previous studies of related problems, insurance incompleteness plays an important role
in ensuring equilibrium existence. In our model economy, incomplete insurance is implied
by costly production of insurance services. The efﬁciency implications of moral hazard may
then be characterized in an otherwise standard general equilibrium setting where individual
insurance and effort choices satisfy ﬁrst- and second-order conditions, but neglect pecuniary
externalities that can be corrected by collective policies.
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